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THINK BEFORE YOU TYPE:
A LOOK AT EMAIL PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE
Meir S. Hornung*
INTRODUCTION
Email has rapidly become the predominant method of
communication for companies around the nation and around the globe,
and most experts agree that it has changed the workplace for the better.'
With the ability to widely transmit large amounts of data
instantaneously, email has emerged as an essential tool for increasing
productivity and efficiency in the workplace.' One benefit email has
over telephone or written communications is that all email messages are
logged and recorded for future reference. However, the basic attributes
of email that have vastly enhanced corporate communication have also
led to a multitude of unexpected difficulties for employers. Among the
problems that the escalating use of email has caused are "increased
[employer] vulnerability to corporate espionage and liability for
fostering a hostile work environment."'
Since email and other electronic communications are highly
valuable assets to companies, employers have chosen to monitor their
use rather than succumb to the difficulties and remove the technology
* J.D. candidate, May 2006, Fordham University School of Law.
1. See American Management Association, 2005 Electronic Monitoring and
Surveillance Survey, http://www.amanet.org/research/pdfs/EMSsummary05.pdf
2. See Electronic Privacy: Hearing on H.R. 4908 Before the Subcomm. on the
Constitution, Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 2000 WL 1268420 (2000)
(statement of Kenneth C. Segarnick, Esquire) (discussing forms of electronic
monitoring of employee email in the workplace).
3. Todd M. Wesche, Reading Your Every Keystroke: Protecting Employee Email
Privacy, 1 J. HIGH TECH. L. 101 (2002). For a more detailed analysis, see infra notes
27-41 and accompanying text.
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altogether. Employers believe that monitoring is necessary both to
discourage illicit activity and to limit liability. The problem that
monitoring presents for employers is that it "is detrimental to employee
privacy and creates unnecessary stress that has a direct negative impact
on emotional and physical health of the employees, ' 4 which can have a
detrimental effect on work product.
The advent of email monitoring in the workplace has spawned a
debate over the propriety of such practices, pitting employers' interest in
preventing misuse of their computer resources against employees'
expectation of privacy in their electronic communications. The
argument over computer surveillance has been further fueled by the
covert nature of most email monitoring programs.5 Employees claim
that without some restriction on an employer's ability to monitor email,
there will be no privacy protection left in the workplace.6 However,
employers support their claim that monitoring is necessary by pointing
to the vast amount of litigation that has resulted from the unmonitored
use of employee email. The debate rages on as to whether it is moral,
ethical, and, most importantly for purposes of this paper, whether it is
legal for employers to surreptitiously monitor the email of their
employees.
This paper will attempt to analyze the laws pertaining to workplace
privacy and apply these laws to the context of email monitoring by
employers. Part I will be a discussion of the background of the right to
privacy as it relates to the workplace. Part II will discuss the
background of employer monitoring, its history, and the modem
monitoring practices. Part II will also discuss the reasons employers
monitor their employees' email communications and the arguments the
employees have against such monitoring. Part III will explain the
common law invasion of privacy requirements, the federal statutory
requirements, and the different types of email systems that currently
exist. Part IV will use the courts' analyses of email cases in order to
derive general rules for determining when employers should be liable for
privacy violations. Part V will briefly outline various state approaches
to the email privacy question and address a variety of proposed
legislation on the subject.
4. Id.
5. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
6. Segamick, supra note 2.
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I. RIGHT To PRIVACY IN THE WORKPLACE
Employees' distaste for monitoring is grounded in the historic right
to privacy that exists in our nation.7 The United States Constitution may
hint at this right to privacy, but it was given shape in an article written in
1890 by Samuel D. Warren and Justice Louis D. Brandeis. These
esteemed authors proclaimed that "[r]ecent inventions and business
methods call attention to the next step which must be taken for the
protection of the person, and for securing to the individual... the right
'to be let alone."' 8  Warren and Brandeis knew that society and the
workplace were constantly advancing and perpetually improving the
way we live and work. They concluded that in order to keep up with the
steady but sure changes that have occurred and will occur in the future,
the American legal system had to evolve to protect this new and
improved way of life along with the individual's privacy rights.9 At the
time that they wrote their article, only a small minority of courts had
embraced the right to privacy thesis that they spoke of.1° However,
throughout the twentieth century, the right to privacy became firmly
entrenched within the American legal system."1
In today's increasingly technological world, the potential danger to
individual privacy interests exists at a level never before seen. In this
fast paced environment, the transmission of large pieces of information
has become as quick and simple as the click of a mouse or the touch of a
button. These technological advancements lead to conflicts between the
interests of employers and employees. The employers have an
established right to run their organization in a method that will best
protect their company, while the employees have a right to privacy in
7. See infra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
8. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right To Privacy, 4 HARV. L.
REv. 193 (1890).
9. Kevin J. Baum, Email in the Workplace and the Right of Privacy, 42 VILL. L.
REv. 1011 (1997).
10. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A, cmt. A (1977).
11. With the impending retirement of Justice 0' Connor, the minority in Casey
may have enough Justices to develop a majority, and the Supreme Court may be in
position to overturn Casey, the case which granted a generally accepted right to privacy.
As Chief Justice Rehnquist said in Casey, past Supreme Court decisions make clear that
the Court does not "endorse any all-encompassing 'right of privacy."' Planned
Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 951 (1992) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring
in judgment, and reversing in part, joined by White, Scalia and Thomas, JJ.).
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While the overwhelming employer response to the employee email
problem has been to monitor email, 3 employees have been quick to
respond. Employees are challenging monitoring techniques under
common law, statutes, and constitutional legal theories in attempts to
maintain their privacy. Thus, while some employees may sue their
employer over an offensive email they receive at work, others seek to
ensure their right to send and receive such an email. Employers are
caught in the middle between the rights of their employees and the
responsibilities the employers have to protect themselves.,
4
The emergence and widespread use of computers and email in the
workplace has created many challenges for employers, their attorneys,
and the courts. Specifically, courts are forced to apply traditional rules
of law to modem technological advancements. Since many of the
traditional rules that governed areas of privacy law focused on slow
moving or stationary matters, courts are unclear how to apply these rules
to email, which has resulted in ambiguity between the rights of
employers and their employees.15
Today, the notion that the scope of an employee's right to privacy,
regardless of the source of the right, is limited by the employee's
reasonable expectation of privacy is accepted as a threshold principle in
evaluating workplace privacy issues. 16  Assessing whether an
employee's expectation of privacy is reasonable in order to determine
whether the privacy right exists has its genesis in the Fourth Amendment
of the United States Constitution, which provides that any "unreasonable
search and seizure"' 7  is unconstitutional. In analyzing the
reasonableness of the search, courts often balance the need to search or
intrude against the resulting invasion of privacy.'8 Limitations on the
12. Baum, supra note 9, at 1012.
13. More then 85% of employers have some form of monitoring practice in place.
American Management Association, supra note 1.
14. Allison R. Michael & Scott M. Lidman, Monitoring Of Employees Still
Growing: Employers Seek Greater Productivity And Avoidance Of Harassment
Liability; Most Workers Have Lost On Privacy Claims, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 29, 2001, at B9.
15. Gregory I. Rasin & Joseph P. Moan, Fitting a Square Peg into a Round Hole:
The Application of Traditional Rules of Law to Modern Technological Advancements in
the Workplace, 66 Mo. L. REV. 793 (2001).
16. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
17. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
18. This will be an underlying theme throughout this paper.
THINK BEFORE YOU TYPE
government's ability to intrude on the constitutional right to privacy
have been specifically recognized where "the most basic decisions about
family and parenthood" are concerned.1 9 As the Supreme Court said in
Casey, "[i]t is settled now ... that the Constitution places limits on a
State's right to interfere with a person's most basic decisions about
family and parenthood., 20  Despite this precedent, establishing clear
limitations on an employer's invasion of an individual's right to privacy
in the workplace has proven to be particularly troublesome for the
courts. Even where such limitations have been articulated, courts often
have been unclear as to when employers' monitoring of employee email
is a violation of the employees' right to privacy.2'
One of the reasons for the conflicting interpretations of an
employee's right to privacy can be attributed to the way in which courts
approach the question. When the first email privacy questions arose,
courts approached the issue by comparing email privacy rights to
preexisting privacy rights.22 The courts were uncertain whether email
should be analogous to traditional mail, or if the privacy rights should
parallel that of workplace lockers and desks.23 There was no clear cut
determination of how the email issue should be approached, and
consequently courts had a problem reconciling email with older forms of
workplace invasions.24 In the last five years, courts have moved away
from the traditional workplace analyses and have come to independently
analyze email privacy questions.25  Although the courts seem to have
19. Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849 (1992). See also
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. Casey, 505 U.S. at 849.
21. Rod Dixon, Windows Nine-to-Five: Smyth v. Pillsbury and the Scope of an
Employee s Right of Privacy in Employer Communications, 2 VA. J.L. & TECH. 4, 13
(1997).
22. See Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746, at *18
(D. Or. Sept 15, 2004). See also McLaren v. Microsoft Corp., No. 05-97-00824-CV,
1999 WL 339015 (Tex. App. 1999) (comparing email privacy to privacy an employee
has in a workplace locker); United States v. Monroe, 50 M.J. 550, 559 (A. F. Ct. Crim.
App. 1999) (comparing email privacy to privacy an employee has in a workplace desk).
23. Thygeson, 2004 WL 2066746 at * 18.
24. Id.
25. See, e.g., Id.; Fischer v. Mount Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914
(W.D. Wis. 2002); Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (E.D. Pa.
2001).
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reached some uniformity in how they approach email privacy issues, the
results are as disparate as they were before.26
II. EMPLOYER MONITORING OF EMPLOYEES
Employer monitoring of their employees at work is a management
pastime that has been around since the birth of our nation. In the past,
when the workplace was simple and everyone used a pen and paper, it
was easy to hide the tracks of what you had done, but being mischievous
took time. With the advent of computer use, employees could work a
little faster, but their questionable actions may have been displayed on a
screen for a long time and anyone walking by could look over their
shoulder and watch them. In current times, with the ease of use of
computers and the speed of the Internet and email, employees can carry
out their rogue behavior quickly and without being noticed by any
passers by. Similarly, harassing emails can be sent instantaneously, and
valuable data "can be taken quickly by electronic duplication.
' 27
This long history of employee monitoring has adapted to new
technologies and employers have used these new technologies to their
advantage. Monitoring software has extended to inventory and cash
register systems that are programmed to detect possible theft or fraud.
Global positioning systems are used to keep track of the whereabouts of
employees while they are driving company vehicles. Systems have even
been installed for food service and health care workers that record
whether or not an employee, who enters a restroom, has stood for a
specified period of time before the sink with the water running and
whether or not the soap dispenser was used.28 The extent of the usage of
such monitoring devices is not known, and has not been advertised by
companies who use them. Email monitoring, however, is well known to
be widely used.
26. Compare Fischer, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914 (denying employer's motion to dismiss
the employee's privacy claim), with Fraser, 135 F. Supp. 2d 623 (granting employer's
motion to dismiss the employee's privacy claim).
27. William C. Donnino, Practice Commentary, New York Penal Code § 156
(1986) (commenting on the reasons behind a new state statute criminalizing the copying
of computer data).
28. Matthew W. Finkin, Information Technology and Workers' Privacy: A
Comparative Study, Part II: National Studies, Information Technology And Workers'
Privacy: The United States Law, 23 CoMP. LAB. & POL'Y J. 471, 489-90 (2002).
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There have been several reasons given by employers to justify the
monitoring of their employees' email. The basic reason is that the
employers are concerned with work productivity. 29 Employers believe
employees are wasting too much time reading and answering their own
personal email, and consequently not doing their jobs. The primary
reason for having email in the workplace is to enhance employee
productivity by allowing individuals to communicate more efficiently
with others. However, the copious utilization of email by employees for
their own personal exploits detracts from the goals of integrating email
into the corporate environment. The misuse of email reduces worker
productivity and eventually diminishes company profits.
Employers also argue that their proprietary email systems become
overcrowded and bogged down as a result of employee personal use, and
thus that monitoring employee email is legitimate.30 Emails that are sent
to just one corporate email account can be, and often are, forwarded to
dozens of other accounts on the company's email system. At first
glance, the problem of filling up the company email servers does not
seem to be a potentially fatal one because basic, everyday text emails do
not take up much space and thus will not overcrowd a server. The
problem is magnified, however, when these mass forwarded emails
contain pictures, audio, or video file attachments. These emails can take
up large amounts of space on the company email system, and if these
emails are forwarded to many employees within the organization, there
can be hundreds of copies sitting on the server, with no benefit to the
corporation. The result can lead to a slowdown of the email system, and
to company employees not receiving work related email in a timely
fashion. At worst, if the company's email server is filled to capacity and
unable to handle any new data, emails will simply be returned to their
sender.
A third reason employers suggest monitoring is that it is necessary
to protect company security and confidential information, which is
stored inside of their company servers.3' Employers are very concerned
about the surreptitious transmission of trade secrets or other confidential
information. Organizations hold a wealth of their own proprietary
29. See American Management Association, supra note 1.
30. Finkin, supra note 28, at 474.
31. Company Computer Communications Policy, Law of the Internet, LEXSTAT
1-2 Law of the Internet, § 2.11 (Matthew Bender 2005).
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information, as well as that of third parties including customers and
suppliers, in electronic format. The ease of attaching large files to
emails, and the speed with which such information can land into a
competitor's hands, have many companies fearful of the possible loss of
business.
Finally, the reason that has become most costly is the concern over
potential employer liability for sexual harassment arising from the
transmission or display of sexually suggestive or demeaning emails
through the company email system.3 2 The National Institute of Business
Management (the "Institute") has reported that if companies do not
monitor the email use of their employees, they are putting their
businesses at risk of being sued for employment discrimination and
sexual harassment.33 The considerable use of email, in comparison to all
other forms of communication, and the speed of the communication can
quickly lead to liability for harassment and discrimination. Employers
can also be liable for simply having tolerated a hostile work
environment.34 Under the doctrine of respondeat superior, an employer
can be held liable if a plaintiff can show that the actions of the employee
were committed within the scope of employment or in furtherance of the
employer's interest. 35 Courts have concluded that any employee conduct
that is closely connected to a work activity is considered within the
scope of their employment, even if such action is forbidden by the
employer.36 As a result of this expansive view of employer liability, the
Institute advises employers that they can and should "monitor email
messages regularly for evidence of discriminatory material.,
37
When employers do not monitor their employees' email, the results
can be devastating. The New Jersey Supreme Court encountered this
situation in Blakey v. Continental Airlines Inc.,38 which held that
derogatory and potentially offensive emails posted on an employer
32. Michael & Lidman, supra note 14.
33. National Institute of Business Management, You & The Law: Quick, Easy-to-
Use Advice on Employment Law 2 (2002).
34. Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2000).
35. Mia G. Settle-Vinson, Employer Liability For Messages Sent By Employees Via
Email And Voice Mail Systems, 24 T. MARSHALL L. REv. 55, 71 (1998).
36. Christopher Pearson Fazekas, 1984 is Still Fiction: Electronic Monitoring in
the Workplace and U.S. Privacy Law, 2004 DuKE L. & TECH REV. 15 (2004).
37. National Institute of Business Management, supra note 33.
38. 751 A.2d. 538 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 2000).
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provided system could support a hostile work environment claim under
the state's anti-discrimination laws.39 The court reasoned that the email
communications system is an extension of the workplace."0
Consequently, the employer's duty to prevent harassment from taking
place in the workplace includes a duty to prevent harassment from
taking place within the employer's email system.4
Email, as well as all forms of Internet communication, has led to
the overburdening of companies with harassment, discrimination and
libel litigation.42 Exchanges on the Internet through chat rooms, email,
and using instant messaging programs produce communications that are
often more frank, sexually explicit, and hostile than communications in
other forms. Some people mistakenly believe that they can write
anything in an email without liability or responsibility. Clearly, this is
not true. Copyright infringement, defamation, and harassment are
examples of potential liability that both employees and companies must
guard against.43
Clearly, employers have many reasons to monitor their employees'
email, but it is just as clear that employees do not want to be monitored.
The obviousness of this statement is echoed by the foremost reason put
forward by employees to prevent email monitoring: people generally
prefer privacy over surveillance. But this argument alone may not be
enough to prevent the monitoring because the Constitutional right to
privacy that has arisen over the last fifty years is a limited one at best,
and has been held not to affect the workplace environment.44
There are numerous other reasons presented by employees to
combat employers' desire to monitor their email. If an employee does
not have privacy in the workplace, they may come to feel that their
employer does not trust them. This perceived lack of trust may lower
employee morale, and erode the mutual respect between an employee
and employer that needs to exist in order for a successful working
relationship to continue. Without this feeling of trust, employees will
39. Id. at 543.
40. Id.
41. Michael & Lidman, supra note 14.
42. Finkin, supra note 28, at 474-77.
43. See, e.g., Finkin, supra note 28, at 474-77; see also Company Computer
Communications Policy, Law of the Internet § 2.11, at 1-2 (Matthew Bender 2005).
44. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987). Some Supreme Court justices do
not believe in any general right of privacy. See supra note 11.
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not work at the same pace and with the same desire to further the
company's interests. Another reason the employees give is that
monitoring can result in extreme harm to the health of the monitored
employees.45 Stress, depression, and anxiety often result from employer
monitoring of email in the workplace. 46  Employee stress may cost
employers more than seventy five billion dollars annually in the form of
absenteeism, turnover, poor management, higher health costs, and the
avoidance of email altogether.47 Employers claim that monitoring of
email is geared towards saving the company money, but in the long run
it may cost the company billions of dollars in employee productivity.
Employees have proposed another theory supporting why they
should be entitled to privacy in the workplace. Employers provide
employees with certain technologically advanced tools such as a
telephone, voicemail, email, and Internet access, all of which allow
employees to accomplish more work in less time. Employees contend
that the increased productivity demands of the workplace, and increased
demand on the amount of time that employees spend at work, require
employees to mingle their personal and professional lives.48 This is
especially so when it comes to such items as email usage. Employees,
therefore, believe the law in this area should recognize "such a real
workplace dynamic."4 9  Employees need to take care of personal
business in the office, and if the employee can most quickly resolve
personal matters by using workplace resources, it is in the employer's
best interest to allow the employee to do so. The only way for the
employee to feel comfortable conducting their personal business at work
is by ensuring that private business will remain private. In such an
environment, where employees' handling of private matters results in a
benefit to the employer in terms of higher morale, increased
productivity, and more time spent at work, employees arguably should
not be forced to sacrifice their privacy rights.50
45. Micah Echols, Striking a Balance Between Employer Business Interests and
Employee Privacy: Using Respondeat Superior to Justify the Monitoring of Web-Based,
Personal Electronic Mail Accounts of Employees in the Workplace, 7 COMP. L. REv. &
TECH. J. 273, 279 (2003).
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Fazekas, supra note 36.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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An employer will favor monitoring whenever it faces potential
liability because of the actions of its employees. Inversely, employers
favor employee privacy when the employer will not be held liable for
the actions of its employees, because the employers understand the
drawbacks of monitoring their employees.5 But when liability is
uncertain, as is most often the case, an employer will seek to protect its
own interests. Since liability is typically decided based on the facts of
an individual case, and is only determined after an employee has already
acted, it is impossible for an employer to grant employees the complete
privacy the employees would like while still avoiding its own liability. 2
One factor that is used in weighing the propriety of email
monitoring is the invasiveness of the technology the employer uses to
monitor." Employer monitoring of company owned proprietary email
accounts does not require much extra work by the company
management. All email that is sent or received through the system is
stored in the server and can be viewed later. Both the intended recipient
and anyone with proper administrative access to the server can read all
email messages stored on the server. No additional software or
hardware needs to be installed on the company network or on the
individual computers in order for the monitoring to take place. The
reason for this is that the storage of email is a necessary component of a
company email system. The storage of email is primarily intended for
use by the end user so that they can store their email for later viewing or
reference. One consequence of the storage is that anyone with access to
the servers can view everyone's email. The only additional requirement
to convert a basic email system into an employee monitoring system is
to have someone spend the time reviewing the employees' email.
In order for an employer to monitor an employee's personal, web-
based email, such as Yahoo, Hotmail, or Gmail, the employers have to
exert a little more effort. New technology allows employers to monitor
web-based email messages and chat conversations, record keystrokes,
and take screenshots of what appears on an employee's screen. 4 To use
this new technology, employers must install additional software or
51. Echols, supra note 45, at 277.
52. Id.
53. Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional
Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REv. 801,866 (2004).
54. One example of this is the Family Keylogger program,
http://www.spyarsenal.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
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hardware directly onto an employee's computer." These supplementary
programs record the designated information, and, in most instances,
periodically email the stored files to a supervisor.16 However, with some
monitoring technologies, the employer must retrieve the information
from the target computer itself 7
These types of automated employee monitoring software systems
have become very sophisticated. These systems can record, filter, and
sort every word of every email that employees type. 8 Even software
that has a core purpose other than to monitor email, such as anti-virus
and spam blocking software, can be used creatively to monitor.
Applications such as pcAnywhere allow remote computer system
administrators to view the computer screens of users in real-time, and
can be used to monitor unsuspecting employees' computer activities.
Monitoring comes in many forms and can be done without an
employee's knowledge or detection. Often, such systems are installed
without any notification to employees that their email is being
monitored. 9
The makers of the monitoring software are aware of the possible
abuses of their programs. To combat this, and any possible legal action
against themselves, they provide a disclaimer that pops up when their
email monitoring programs are installed. One example of such a
disclaimer reads:
Before using any of our products, documentation and web site(s),
you must understand that under some circumstances and under
certain legal conditions your use/misuse of the software can lead you
to a court (a legal action can be taken against you). Make sure using
our software does not interfere with your local laws. You must
understand that if your actions will be classified as intruding on third
party privacy, you will be the only person responsible for this....
The United States Department of Justice recommends that a banner
notice giving [sic] clear and unequivocal notice to intruders that by
signing on to the system, they are expressly consenting to having
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. One example of this is the KeyGhost Keylogger device,
http://www.keyghost.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
58. One example of this is the Beyond Keylogger program,
http://www.supremtec.com (last visited Nov. 21, 2005).
59. Wesche, supra note 3, at 106.
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their keystrokes monitored.
60
III: FEDERAL AND COMMON LAW ELECTRONIC PRIVACY PROTECTION
As is often the case in the legal arena, this dispute over the
propriety of email monitoring frequently leads to lawsuits. When an
employee decides to sue an employer for an invasion of privacy, the
employee can sue under the Federal Wiretap Act,61 or the common law
tort of invasion of privacy.62 The basis of each of these sources of
liability lies in the aforementioned right to privacy.63
The constitutionally protected right to privacy was derived from the
penumbra of other protections found in the Bill of Rights.64 Such rights,
however, generally cannot be enforced against non-governmental
entities.6' The privacy right at issue from illicit monitoring of email can
possibly be proscribed by the Fourth Amendment itself, without any
need to attach to the penumbras of privacy protections. The Amendment
states in pertinent part "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and affects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated., 66 This Fourth Amendment prohibition
against unreasonable searches and seizures serves as a launching pad for
any complete discussion of one's rights in relation to interception of
messages from email systems. Although this analysis applies to a public
employer,67 the same tests utilized by the Supreme Court in Fourth
Amendment cases are used to resolve email monitoring issues in the
60. This disclaimer appears when the Family Keylogger program is installed. The
disclaimer is available at http://www.spyarsenal.com/disclaimer.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2005).
61. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2712 (2002).
62. O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
63. See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text.
64. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (discussing the penumbra
of privacy rights emanating from the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth
Amendments); see also, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S.
833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438
(1972).
65. See, e.g., Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243, 247-49 (1833).
66. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
67. O'Connor, 480 U.S. 709.
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context of the private workplace.68 These tests will be used to analyze
the current state of the law with regards to both the federal statute and
the common law tort.69
There is some degree of privacy possessed by employees in the
workplace. Some states have codified the privacy right or provided for
the right in their state constitution. The courts have, in varying degrees,
found that privacy does exist in the private workplace.70 In order to
prevail in a suit for violation of those rights, the plaintiff must prove that
they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the space or materials
that were invaded.7' There is a significant question regarding the
privacy, or lack thereof, of an employee's personal email
communications sent, received, and stored at the workplace.72
Employees in the public sector enjoy a degree of privacy granted to
them by way of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment protections
against unreasonable searches and seizures. The United States Supreme
Court announced in O'Connor v. Ortega that public employees enjoy a
degree of privacy that is tempered by variations in each employment
relationship, and the degree of privacy that each particular environment
can afford is evaluated on a case-by-case basis.73 Private employees,
however, are protected by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act
of 1986 (ECPA), which authorizes civil as well as criminal sanctions for
those who intentionally access email services without authorization or in
excess of their authorization.74
The ECPA not only protects the privacy of employee email
communications, but results in the privacy of all wire and electronic
communication in the United States being governed by federal statute.
In 1968, Congress enacted Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act, commonly known as the Federal Wiretap Act.75 The
purpose of this Act was to protect individual privacy by limiting the
68. Settle-Vinson, supra note 35, at 61-62.
69. See infra Part IV.
70. See, e.g,. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849
(1992); see also, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Eisenstadt v. Baird 405 U.S. 438
(1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
71. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
72. See, e.g., Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
73. 480 U.S. at 709.
74. Wesche, supra note 3, at 109-110.
75. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2712 (2002).
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circumstances by which the interception of communications may
lawfully take place.7 6  The Wiretap Act was created soon after the
Supreme Court overturned a New York wiretapping statute by declaring
it unconstitutional in violation of the Fourth Amendment right to
privacy.77 Congress drafted the Wiretap Act with the instructions of the
Court in the forefront of their minds.78 Its statutory framework was
designed to satisfy the Court's strict requirements for surreptitious
surveillance so as not to violate anyone's Fourth Amendment right to
privacy. 79 Although it was primarily intended to address government
wiretaps, the 1968 Act applies to private individuals and employers as
well. 80 Eighteen years later, in reaction to technological advances, the
ECPA amended the 1968 Act. 8' The ECPA added protection against the
unlawful interception and disclosure of electronic communication to the
existing protection of wire and oral communication.82 It also proscribed
the unlawful access and disclosure of electronically stored wire and
electronic communications under Title II of the ECPA, commonly
known as the Stored Communications Act (SCA).83
Despite their obvious importance, the statutes remain poorly
understood. Courts, legislators, and legal scholars alike have had a very
hard time making sense of these federal statutes.84 They are dense and
confusing, and the two sections of the amended Federal Wiretap Act, at
times, seem to contradict or diminish the use of one another.85 As a
76. Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 386 (D. Del. 1997) (citing S. Rep.
No. 541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3557, 3559).
77. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967) (Although the case holding was later
overturned, the act was created to fit within the court's framework of searches and
seizures, and the reasons for creating the statute did not change).
78. Id. at 56.
79. Supplemental Brief for of Amicus Curiae The Center for Democracy and
Technology, et al. as Supporting United States at 1, United States v. Councilman, 418
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (No. 03-1383).
80. Baum, supra note 9, at 1022 n. 55-58.
81. Dan McIntosh, E-Monitoring@ Workplace. Corn: The Future Of
Communication Privacy In The Minnesota Private-Sector Workplace, 23 HAML1NE L.
REv. 539, 548 (2000).
82. Title I of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2522 (2002).
83. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2711 (2002).
84. See, e.g., United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 84 (1st Cir. 2005); United
States v. Smith, 155 F.3d 1051, 1055 (9th Cir. 1998). Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v.
United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 462 (5th Cir. 1994); Dixon, supra note 21.
85. Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868, 877-79 (9th Cir. 2002); Id. at
2005]
130 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORA TE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
result of the current incarnation of this act, the statute has been called a
"skein of statutory opacity. This uncertainty has made it difficult for
legislators to legislate in the field, reporters to write about the law, and
scholars to offer guidance in this very important area of law.87 Federal
circuit courts have called the Wiretap Act, "complex," 88 "convoluted, '' 9
and "ambiguous.' 90
Email messages exist in formats covered by both the ECPA and
SCA, depending on whether the email messages are being sent between
parties or stored for backup purposes. 91 Thus, email messages are
protected by different sections of the ECPA depending on their purpose
at any particular time. A message that is first being sent from one party
to another is protected under Title I of the ECPA, whereas a message
that has already been read and is being stored for later viewing is
protected under Title II, the SCA.92 This conflict between the ECPA and
the SCA has led to much conflict in the courts, leading to many heated
dissents.93 Oddly enough, until very recently, there was a consensus
with regard to how to apply the differences between the two statutes.94
After a recent en bane decision of the Unites States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit, overturning a panel decision rendered in the same
case,95 the entire matter is once again fraught with vagueness.96
As noted in a law review comment on the topic, "[a]lthough the
ECPA does not directly mention email, the Act's legislative history
888-92 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
86. Finkin, supra note 28, at 478.
87. Orin S. Kerr, The Future of Internet Surveillance, Privacy & The USA Patriot
Act: Surveillance Law: Reshaping The Framework.- A User's Guide to the Stored
Communications Act, and a Legislator's Guide to Amending it, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
1208 (2004).
88. Smith, 155 F.3d at 1055.
89. Id.
90. See Councilman, 418 F.3d at 84.
91. Konop, 302 F.3d at 888-92 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 888.
93. See Councilman, 418 F.3d at 85-90 (1st Cir. 2005) (Torruella, and Cyr, J.J.
dissenting); see also Konop, 302 F.3d at 888-92 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
94. Compare Councilman, 418 F.3d at 84 (disagreeing with other courts regarding
temporary storage), with United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 203 (1st Cir.
2004) vacated, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (agreeing with other courts regarding
temporary storage).
95. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67.
96. See infra notes 154-65 and accompanying text.
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makes it clear that e-mail is included within the ECPA's definition of
electronic communication." 97 This is exhibited in the statements made
in the Senate in consideration of the amendments made to the ECPA in
1986:
Tremendous advances in telecommunications and computer
technologies have carried with them comparable technological
advances in surveillance devices and techniques. Electronic
hardware making it possible for overzealous law enforcement
agencies, industrial spies and private parties to intercept the personal
or proprietary communications of others are readily available in the
American market today ....
The law must advance with technology to ensure the continued
vitality of the Fourth Amendment. Privacy cannot be left to depend
solely on physical protection, or it will gradually erode as technology
advances. Congress must act to protect the privacy of our citizens.
If we do not, we will promote the gradual erosion of this precious
right.98
The key provisions of the ECPA state, "[a]ny person who
intentionally intercepts, endeavors to intercept, or procures any other
person to intercept or endeavor to intercept, any wire, oral, or electronic
communication.., shall be punished." 99  While these provisions, by
themselves, would appear to prohibit employer monitoring of employee
email, the ECPA contains three key exceptions that allow employers to
monitor employee communications. These three exceptions are: the
business use exception, 1°° the service provider exception, 101 and the
consent exception. 10 2  The courts have added a fourth exception to
ECPA liability that requires the interception of the communication be
97. Jared D. Beeson, Cyberprivacy on the Corporate Intranet: Does the Law Allow
Private-Sector Employers to Read Their Employees' Email? 20 HAWAII L. REV. 165,
173 (1998) (citing S. Rep. No. 99-541, at 2 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3555, 3562 (describing email as one "of the new telecommunications and computer
technologies referred to in the Electronic Communications Privacy Act")).
98. Wesley College v. Pitts, 974 F. Supp. 375, 386 (D. Del. 1997) (quoting S. Rep.
No. 95-541, at 5 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3557, 3559).
99. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a) (2002).
100. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a) (2002).
101. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(i) (2002).
102. Id. at § 2511 (2)(d).
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contemporaneous with the transmission of the communication. 10 3 These
four exceptions will be analyzed in greater detail when they are applied
to specific circumstances of email monitoring. 10 4
The other path that employees can pursue while seeking to sue their
employer is to bring a lawsuit under the tort entitled invasion of
privacy.'l 5 The common law offense of invasion of privacy can be
violated by one of four distinct invasions into the private life of an
individual. 10 6 "Of these four, the tort commonly called unreasonable
intrusion upon the seclusion of another appears to be the most applicable
to email monitoring."' 0 7  The Restatement (Second) of Torts reads,
"[o]ne who intentionally intrudes, physically or otherwise, upon the
solitude or seclusion of another or his private affairs or concerns, is
subject to liability to the other for invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person.
'' °8
To prove this common law claim for invasion of privacy, a plaintiff
must satisfy two separate and distinct requirements. First, the plaintiff
must show that a reasonable expectation of privacy existed. 0 9 Second,
the plaintiff must show that there was a highly offensive invasion of that
privacy." ° In order to fulfill the first requirement, to prove a legitimate
expectation of privacy, a plaintiff must show that their subjective
expectation of privacy is one that society accepts as objectively
reasonable."' After the court has established there has been an invasion,




103. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002); Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457 (5th Cir. 1994); but see
United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (2005) (holding that email that is in storage
can be intercepted for the purpose of liability under the Wiretap Act).
104. See infra Part III. The Electronic Communication Privacy Act and the Stored
Communications Act were further amended by the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, the
USA PATRIOT Act. The PATRIOT Act, however, did not substantially affect the
subsections of the Wiretap Act that are relevant to the topic at hand.
105. Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97, 100-01 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
106. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977).
107. Beeson, supra note 97, at 209.
108. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
109. Id.; Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101. ,
110. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977); Smyth, 914 F. Supp. at 101.
111. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000).
112. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
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Before any court had an opportunity to examine privacy in the
context of email, the Third Circuit commented on the applicability of the
tort of intrusion upon seclusion to an employer reading the personal,
postal mail of an employee. In Vernars v. Young, 3 a corporate officer,
without authority to do so, opened and read postal mail that had been
addressed and delivered to another Vernars employee and, moreover,
had been plainly marked "personal."' 14 The court held that the action of
the employer constituted an intrusion upon seclusion."' This case
implies that a common law right to privacy may exist in one's personal
mail, fulfilling the first requirement of the Restatement. 16 From the
language the court uses,'1 7 it seems clear that this expectation of privacy
in one's personal mail would be reasonable, thus fulfilling the second
requirement of the Restatement. 118  However, the courts have not
extended the right to privacy as expressed in Vernars to cover email,
despite the similarities between email and postal mail.' 9
The employee's choice of law and decision of what doctrine to sue
under may be based on what kind of email was monitored and how the
monitoring took place. There are two classes of email that are used in
the corporate environment and are pertinent to the privacy analyses:
company email accounts and web-based, personal email accounts.
Company email accounts are meant for internal company
communications and for communications with a company's clients.
While it may be a company's intention that their email system only be
used for company purposes, the email system itself will not prevent
personal email from being sent, even if there are corporate policies
preventing such use. Company accounts are accessed by using software
that is specifically installed for this purpose, such as Microsoft Outlook
or Exchange and Novell GroupWise. One example of such an email
account is BillGates@microsoft.com1 20  The company email systems
are managed by email servers, to which the employer has complete
113. 539 F.2d 966 (3rd Cir. 1976).
114. Id. at 968.
115. Id. at 969.
116. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
117. Vemars, 539 F.2d at 969.
118. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
119. Wesche, supra note 3, at 112.
120. This is a fictitious email address. Most large companies have their own email
domain and their own email servers servicing the email accounts.
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access to view all incoming and outgoing email. All email sent using
the company email system is saved on the company server even after an
employee deletes the email from their account.
Web-based, personal email accounts are accessed through the
Internet using any commercially available web browser such as Internet
Explorer, Netscape, or Opera. If an employer provides Internet access
through its network, the employees may access a web-based, personal
email account from any workplace computer. The major difference
between the web-based form and company email "is that e-mails sent
and received by the web-based personal accounts are not automatically
stored on the company server.' ' 121 Email is instead stored on the email
provider's servers at an offsite location. No one in the employee's
company has access to the employee's stored web-based personal email.
This form of email is not routinely saved to the employee's computer,
and therefore the employer can not view the email by accessing the
computer that the employee works with.
IV: WHAT COURTS SAY ABOUT EMPLOYER LIABILITY FOR PRIVACY
VIOLATIONS
A. Monitoring Employee Corporate Email Accounts
The next step in evaluating employer liability for the monitoring of
employee email is to analyze how the ECPA and the Restatement apply
to the two categories of email. In order to understand how the courts
have analyzed the email privacy questions, one must keep in mind that
many companies have implemented corporate email policies. These
policies give notification to employees that their email will be monitored
and require the employee to consent to the monitoring. 22 The consent
of employees to be monitored, or the lack of consent, is a major factor
the courts use in determining employer liability for email monitoring.1
21
When an employee has consented to monitoring of their email,
courts have overwhelmingly ruled in the employer's favor when the
employer has monitored the employee's use of a company email
121. Echols, supra note 45, at 277.
122. See infra note 265 for an example of such a policy.
123. TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v. Zieminski, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 451-453 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2002).
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account.124  In applying the Restatement standard, the key issue is
whether there is a reasonable expectation of privacy, which is "an
objective entitlement founded on broadly based and widely accepted
community norms, and the presence or absence of opportunities to
consent voluntarily to activities impacting privacy interests obviously
affects the expectations of the participant.
1 25
The nature of the workplace is generally a public one, and an
employee is hired for the purpose of furthering company business and
not to attend to personal matters. It should be expected that all use of
the tools that the employer provides should be for company business,
and any use of such tools should not carry any expectation of privacy.
Predictably, employer provided tools should be restricted to use for
company business. These tools should not carry any expectation of
privacy.
Another reason the courts give for the diminished expectation of
privacy is that emails can be forwarded to anyone. 26  The original
sender of an email may think that their words are private and will only
be read by the intended recipient, but this is not true because the
recipient can forward the email to any number of people. Although the
sender's intentions were that only the recipient read the email, the sender
knows or should know of the possibility that the email can be forwarded
to anyone. There can be no expectation of privacy in such a
communication that can be instantaneously sent to anyone that has
access to an Internet connection.
Email transmissions in many ways are no different than older forms
of communication. For example, when one sends a letter in the mail via
the United States Postal Service and addresses it to a certain person, the
sender has a reasonable expectation of privacy in that letter.'27 The
sender believes that no one but the addressed recipient will read the
letter. However, once the letter is received by the intended recipient, the
recipient may do as they please with the letter. The recipient can post it
wherever they want, and may show it to whomever they choose.
Similarly, an email message, once it is received, can be copied, posted or
124. Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Cybertorts and Legal Lag: An
EmpiricalAnalysis, 13 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 77, 95 (2003).
125. TBG Ins. Servs. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 4th at 449 (quoting Hill v. Nat'l Collegiate
Athletic Ass'n, 7 Cal. App. 4th 1, 36-37 (1994)) (internal citations omitted).
126. Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823, 831 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001).
127. Id.
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forwarded, but with much greater ease than with traditional mail. As a
result of the control the recipient of any mail or email message has, the
sender cannot retain any expectation of privacy with the message once it
is in the hands of the recipient.
128
The courts have ruled that employees have no reasonable
expectation of privacy for communications transmitted over an
employer's email system.129 One reason the courts give for allowing
employer monitoring of employee email is that the employers are
unlikely to abuse their monitoring privilege.130 The courts reasoned that
it is in the employer's best interest to balance surveillance needs with
employee quality of life.131 Another reason that employers will not
likely abuse their privilege is that employer misuse of personal
information is prohibited by a variety of existing legal doctrines.
132
Courts have also noted, however, that even if there was some
expectation of privacy in the employee's email, it is outweighed by the
employer's interests in preventing inappropriate or illegal activity.133 In
such a case, the invasion of privacy would not pass muster of the second
requirement of the Restatement, that the invasion be "highly
offensive."'
13 4
With regard to the second requirement of the Restatement, that the
invasion be highly offensive, the courts have applied the same
reasonableness test that they apply to the first requirement of the
Restatement. 135 In fact, courts use the exact same reasons to show that
the invasion is reasonable as they use to prove that the invasion is not
offensive. 3 6 There are no novel explanations as to why an unreasonable
invasion of privacy in an email context would not be highly offensive.
Courts simply restate the arguments for the invasion not being
unreasonable, and change the words to fit into the offensiveness
128. Id.
129. See, e.g., Id.
130. Fazekas, supra note 36, at *26-27.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 28.
133. See Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97, 101 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
134. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
135. See id.
136. See, e.g., Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746
(D. Or. Sept 15, 2004); Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-
RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002); TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v.
Zieminski, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443,450 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Smyth, 914 F. Supp 97.
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requirement. 137  If the facts in a case show that the monitoring
constitutes an invasion of privacy according to a reasonable person, then
the courts would be hard pressed to skew the justifications that did not
work in the employer's favor in the first Restatement requirement to fall
on the employer's side with respect to the second requirement of the
Restatement. This may account for the reason that so few cases proceed
past the first hurdle of proving that the invasion was offensive to a
reasonable person. What it seems from the courts' analyses is that if it is
a reasonable invasion, it is necessarily not highly offensive, and if it is
highly offensive, then it is probably not a reasonable invasion of
privacy. "'
Notice and consent can also be bars to a tort claim against an
employer. When an employer gives notice to an employee that email
may be monitored, this "undermines the reasonableness of an
employee's claim that he or she believed such information was private
and not subject to search." 3 9 In such an instance, "the employee [would
have been] explicitly cautioned that information flowing through or
stored on computers within the network cannot be considered
confidential, and.., that network administrators and others were free to
view data downloaded from the internet." 40 There is also a separate, but
related theory as to why employers are allowed to monitor employee
emails. It would be counter intuitive to hold that an employer should be
liable for illegal acts committed by employees through the use of email
by relying on the doctrine of respondeat superior, without providing the
employer with the legal means to monitor the email that can cause them
to be liable.
141
In order to analyze the situation where an employer monitors a
company email system with the consent of the employees, the four
exceptions to the ECPA must be individually applied. If an employer
falls into any of these four exceptions, the employer is exempt from
137. See, e.g., Thygeson, 2004 WL 2066746; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343; TBG Ins. Servs. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 4th at 450; Smyth,
914 F. Supp at 97.
138. See, e.g., Thygeson, 2004 WL 2066746; John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co.,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343; TBG Ins. Servs. Corp., 96 Cal. App. 4th at 450; Smyth,
914 F. Supp at 97.
139. United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 835 (D. Neb. 2003).
140. Id.
141. See Echols, supra note 45, at 295-298.
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liability for the interception of an employee's email; however, it is still
beneficial to analyze all four exceptions. The first exception to the
ECPA is the business use exception.1 42 The exception states that any
equipment or component used in the ordinary course of business is not
considered an electronic device for the purpose of the statute. 43 As a
result of the component not being considered a device, an employer who
uses such a tool to monitor an employee is not liable under the ECPA.
144
A company email system is such a business tool.
The second exception to the ECPA is the service provider
exception. This provision states that "[i]t shall not be unlawful...
for... an officer, employee, or agent of a provider of wire or electronic
communication service... to intercept.., that communication in the
normal course of his employment."'' 45 In situations where an employee
is using the company, proprietary email system, the employer is the
service provider of the "electronic communication service," which
places the employer squarely within the confmes of the service provider
exception to the ECPA.1
46
Consent is the third exception to the ECPA. The statute provides
that, "[iut shall not be unlawful under this chapter for a person.., to
intercept a wire, oral, or electronic communication ... where one of the
parties to the communication has given prior consent to such
interception.' 47 In such an instance where an employer is monitoring a
company email system, there is written or implied consent from the
employee who is "one of the parties to the communication.'
4 8
Therefore, the employer will be exempt from liability under the ECPA.
However,
even if an employer can successfully establish that the monitoring of
employee communications was expressly or impliedly consented to,
an employee may still be able to prevail if he or she establishes that
the employer had a criminal or tortious purpose for conducting the
monitoring. This "tortious purpose" must be more than an
142. See 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a) (2002).
143. Id.
144. Id. § 2511 (1) (2002).
145. Id. § 2511 (2)(a)(i) (2002).
146. See McIntosh, supra note 81, at 549-553 for a further discussion on the
applicability of the business use exception to email monitoring.
147. Id. § 2511 (2)(d).
148. Id.
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employer's mere intent to surreptitiously record a conversation. For
instance, extortion, blackmail, and causing emotional distress are
examples of such tortious purposes. In addition, even if some lawful
purpose exists to justify the interception, there may still be a tortious
or otherwise unlawful purpose behind the interception that would
take it out of the Consent Exception. 1
49
The last exception to the ECPA is the court-added contemporaneity
requirement. In Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret
Service, the Fifth Circuit was one of the first courts to hold that for an
employer to be in violation of the ECPA, the employer must intercept
the email at the time of transmission. 150  Nearly every court that has
subsequently decided the issue has agreed with the Fifth Circuit that to
be in violation of the ECPA, the interception must be contemporaneous
with the transmission of the email.
15
'
The Ninth Circuit, for example, held in Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines
that this definition is consistent with the intent of the ECPA, which
created the Stored Communications Act for the express purpose of
addressing access to stored electronic communications.1 52 The vigorous
dissent in Konop argued that the term "intercept" cannot possibly mean
that the interception must be contemporaneous with transmission.153
The dissent contended that such a requirement would render the ECPA
toothless and completely destroy any value of the SCA. 15 4
The dissent in Konop based its assertions on the premise that Steve
Jackson Games was rendered somewhat obsolete by the growth of the
Internet, a phenomenon that the Fifth Circuit judges deciding that case
could not have meaningfully incorporated into their reading of the
statute.155 In particular, it would have been impossible to anticipate the
expectations of privacy that people would develop regarding the
Internet, expectations that are crucial to interpreting the statutory scheme
consistent with Congressional intent to protect privacy interests. 5 6 Still,
nearly every court has agreed with the majority in Konop that to be in
149. McIntosh, supra note 81, at 557.
150. 36 F.3d 457, 459 (5th Cir. 1994).
151. See, e.g., Konop v. Hawaiian Airlines, 302 F.3d 868 (9th Cir. 2002).
152. See id. at 878-79.
153. See id. at 886-87.
154. See id. at 887-89 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
155. See id. at 889.
156. See id. at 890-91.
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violation of the ECPA, the interception must be contemporaneous with
the transmission. 57  In cases of employer controlled systems, the
interception is never contemporaneous with the transmission because the
employer intercepts the email as soon as it enters the company email
system, but after the transmission of the email and well before the email
reaches the recipient. Given this procedure, an employee will never
have a federal cause of action against an employer for email that is
monitored through a company email system.
In a recent decision, the First Circuit disagreed with every other
circuit court on this topic. 58 The Councilman opinion reads very similar
to the dissent in Konop.' 59 In Councilman, the First Circuit disagreed
with the interpretation that the other circuit courts gave to the legislative
intent of Congress when they created the ECPA. 160 The First Circuit
held that "Congress had in mind these types of pre- and post-
transmission 'temporary, intermediate storage of a wire or electronic
communication incidental to the electronic transmission thereof,' when
it established the definition of 'electronic storage.', 1 6 1  The court
reasoned that Congress did not mean to exclude the type of temporary
storage that a message goes through during its transmission from the
scope of the ECPA.'62 Consistent with the dissent in Konop, the
Councilman court did not believe that Congress intended that an email
message, while in transit from the sender to the recipient, switches back
and forth between ECPA protection and SCA protection. The court
stated that "we doubt that Congress contemplated the existential oddity
that Councilman's interpretation creates: messages.., briefly cease to
be electronic communications for very short intervals, and then suddenly
become electronic communications again."'164 In sum, the court rejected
the accepted distinction that email messages cease to be an "electronic
157. See, e.g., Theofel v. Farey-Jones 359 F.3d 1066, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 2004);
Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F. 3d 107, 113-14 (3rd Cir. 2003); Steve
Jackson Games, Inc. v. United States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457, 461-62 (5th Cir. 1994).
158. See Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
159. See Konop, 302 F.3d at 887-91 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting).
160. See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67, 72-77 (1st Cir. 2005).
161. Id. at 77 (quoting the language of the ECPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2510(17)) (internal
citations omitted).
162. Id.
163. Id. at 78.
164. Id.
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communication" during the "momentary intervals, intrinsic to the
communication process, at which the message resides in transient
electronic storage."'1
65
The court in Councilman held that email in temporary storage can
still be intercepted; therefore, the email need not be "in transmission" to
fall under the ECPA.166 While it may seem as though the court was
doing away with the contemporaneity requirement, the court stated
unequivocally that "we [] need not decide that question,' ' 167 whether the
interception needs to occur contemporaneously with the transmission.
The court did hint that it wanted to do away with the contemporaneity
requirement when it said that it was not "prepared to recognize a
contemporaneity or real-time requirement,"' 68 however, the Councilman
court was simply not clear about what it wanted the decision to mean for
any future sets of facts that may arise. The court may have tried to
clarify the law with respect to email interception, but they failed to do
so.
The analysis for email monitoring on an employer system without
the consent of the employee is much the same analysis as for monitoring
with employee consent. The only difference in the Restatement analysis
is that there is no reduction of the expectation of privacy due to consent
to being monitored. When there is no employee consent, the legal rules
are not clear. "[W]here [an] employer has no policy notifying
employees that their computer use could be monitored, and there is no
indication that the employer directs others to routinely access the
employees' computers, the employees' subjective beliefs that their
computer files are private may be objectively reasonable.' ' 169 However,
an organization that has a company handbook notifying employees of an
email monitoring scheme will escape liability for such monitoring. 170
One example of such a company handbook is that of U.S. Bancorp,
165. See id. at 79.
166. Id. at 70.
167. Id. at 80.
168. Id. (stating "[w]e note, however, that even were we prepared to recognize a
contemporaneity or real-time requirement-a step that we do not take today-we think
it highly unlikely that Councilman could generate a winning argument in the
circumstances of this case.").
169. United States v. Bailey, 272 F. Supp. 2d 822, 835 (D. Neb. 2003).
170. Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746, at *20 (D.
Or. Sept 15, 2004).
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discussed in Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp.17 1 The handbook stated that
"U.S. Bancorp reserves the right to monitor any employee's email and
computer files for any legitimate business reason."'7 2 Regardless of
whether an employee subjectively believes that emails will be private,
such a belief is not objectively reasonable after the employee is notified
by an employer that email will be monitored.'73
Some courts have even gone so far as to say that with regard to a
company, proprietary email system, the employer may monitor email
even when the employees have been assured that all email
communications would remain confidential. 74 In Smyth v. Pillsbury, the
employer repeatedly assured its employees that email communications
would not be intercepted. 175  Even with these clear and obvious
statements, the court still held that employee Smyth had no cause of
action for invasion of privacy. 76 Smyth's reasonable expectation of
privacy, combined with the offensiveness of the invasion, did not
outweigh the company's interest in self protection. 177  The court
concluded that "the company's interest in preventing inappropriate and
unprofessional comments or even illegal activity over its email system
outweighs any privacy interests the employees may have.' 78  Even
without the consent of the employee, employers are free to monitor
employee email without any fear of liability under the Restatement when
they are monitoring their own email systems.
As seen in Smyth, when an employee relies on a company policy
that is supposed to protect them from invasions of privacy, the result
may not be what they expected. However, in some jurisdictions,
reliance on a company policy that is clearly spelled out in a personnel
manual can protect an employee from an unwarranted invasion by their
employer. Such is the law in Massachusetts, where this type of written
company policy could be enforced against an employer as an express
contract. 179 An intrusion into the privacy of an employee in violation of
171. Id.
172. Id. at *20.
173. Id.
174. Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
175. Id. at 98.
176. Id. at 101.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Wesche, supra note 3, at 114.
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this written company policy could give rise to a claim for breach of
contract.18 0  Such a provision could cause an employee to have a
reasonable expectation of privacy, a prerequisite to a cause of action
under the common law invasion of privacy tort. In other states where
the breach of contract claim does not arise from the company policy,
employers may be able to ignore their own policies prohibiting email
monitoring, with no recourse to their employees beyond the exception
filled ECPA remedies.18' "Reliance in good faith on the policy may not
be sufficient to protect employee privacy."'
' 82
Another reason for employers' apparent freedom to monitor email
is that "[o]nce [a] plaintiff communicated.., over an email system
which was apparently utilized by the entire company, any reasonable
expectation of privacy was lost."' 8' 3 The Smyth court holding heavily
weighted the fact that the email was voluntarily sent, and such
communications have no privacy interests. 8 4 In analyzing the second
prong of the tort of invasion of privacy, namely that the invasion be
highly offensive, the court relied on the same grounds for dismissing the
plaintiff's claim.8 5 Following reasoning similar to what they had used
to decide there was no invasion at all, the court opined that since the
plaintiff voluntarily sent the email, any invasion into such
communication is not highly offensive. 86  Once again,8 7 the court
blurred the line between the two requirements of the Restatement, that
there is an invasion of privacy and that such an invasion is highly
offensive. According to the Restatement, once a court decides that there
is no invasion of privacy, then there need not be a discussion whether
the invasion was highly offensive. 188  Nevertheless, courts tend to
analyze the second prong even after they decide that the first








187. For another instance of the court blurring the lines, see supra notes 135-138
and accompanying text.
188. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
189. See, e.g., Smyth 914 F. Supp. at 100-01.
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comfortable relying on nullifying one requirement alone because the
reasoning and logic applied to both requirements is flawed and out of
touch with modem technology.
In a minority of cases where employees have been notified of
monitoring, courts have held that there is still a reasonable expectation
of privacy. In Haynes v. Office of the Attorney General Phill Kline, the
United States District Court for the District of Kansas ruled that the
plaintiff had successfully demonstrated a subjective expectation of
privacy and raised serious issues concerning whether this expectation of
privacy was objectively reasonable.' 90 In that case, there was some
evidence of notification: every day a policy was displayed on the
computers in the Attorney General's office. The policy read, in part:
"[t]here shall be no expectation of privacy using this system."' 9' This
screams notification loud and clear. The court, however, employed a
balancing test to consider the policy against oral representations made
by employees of the Attorney General to the plaintiff. 192 The court held
that the facts, taken as a whole, suggested that the plaintiff's expectation
of privacy was objectively reasonable.' 93 The other factors that the court
considered were that
employees are allowed to use their work computers for private
communications; employees are told how to create 'public' and
'private' files; employees are advised that 'intentional access to
another user's email without permission' is prohibited; employees
are given passwords to prevent others from gaining access to their
computers; and there was no evidence that any AG official had ever
monitored or viewed any private files, documents or emails of any
employee. 194
The approach is logical, yet novel, and it has not been followed by
any other court when dealing with a company email system. Following
such an approach would provide a well balanced test, weighing the
values of the rights of employers and employees in each individual case.
However, as it now stands, this is not the practice followed in most
190. 298 F. Supp. 2d 1154 (D. Kan. 2003).
191. Id. at 1162.
192. Id. at 1161-62.
193. Id.
194. Id.
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courts. 95
The ECPA provides additional requirements against which non-
consensual email monitoring must be tested.1 96  As under the
Restatement, the analysis of non-consensual email monitoring is similar
to the analysis where the employer has obtained consent from the
employee. Under both circumstances, the ECPA recognizes that an
employer may avoid liability by meeting any of the exceptions regarding
business use, service provider, and contemporaneity. Courts are split,
however, on how to approach situations where express consent has not
been obtained from the employee.1 97 Case law has established that
under U.S.C. § 251 l(2)(d), consent may be either express or implied. 98
Courts have explained implied consent by analogizing the sending of
email to leaving a message on an answering machine.' 99 When one
leaves a message on an answering machine or a voice mail system, the
caller knows that the message was saved on the machine and can be
permanently archived. Similarly, in the email context, the sender knows
that the nature of sending an email is that a record of it can be
downloaded, printed, saved, and stored on the company email system.
Accordingly, by the act of sending an email via the Internet, the sender
"expressly consents by conduct to the recording of the message. 200
However, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit mentioned that
such consent "is not to be cavalierly implied. 2 0' Because courts have
diverging decisions on the issue, it is unclear whether the consent
exception would be applied in the context of an employer that monitors
the company email system without the express consent of its employees.
Nevertheless, the other three ECPA exceptions would apply and would
exempt an employer from liability.
The consent exception under the ECPA represents perhaps the most
195. See, e.g., Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746
(D. Or. Sept 15, 2004); Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-
RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002); TBG Ins. Servs. Corp. v.
Zieminski, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 450 (Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F.
Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
196. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-2511 (2002).
197. See, e.g., Watkins v. L.M. Berry & Co., 704 F.2d 577, 581 (1lth Cir. 1983);
Commonwealth v. Proetto, 771 A.2d 823 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2001); Smyth, 914 F. Supp 97.
198. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581.
199. Proetto, 771 A.2d at 830.
200. Id.
201. Watkins, 704 F.2d at 581.
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fair of the four exceptions to employer liability for employee
monitoring. The exception focuses on the employer's conduct
informing employees about workplace monitoring and the employee's
express or implied consent to such monitoring. It also permits the
imposition of liability on an employer that otherwise meets the
exception's requirements if the employer has acted with a criminal or
202tortious purpose.
Evaluating the employer's purpose for monitoring ensures that, to
the extent employees surrender some of their privacy rights because
of the realities of the workplace, the employer cannot improperly use
information gathered as a result of monitoring. Conversely, an
employer who has provided adequate notice of the occurrence and
extent of monitoring activity will not be liable for such monitoring,
unless the monitoring is conducted with a criminal or tortious
203purpose.
Thus, the consent exception achieves the greatest balance of rights
among the ECPA exceptions because its applicability is conduct
dependent. "Given the large percentage of employers who now inform
their employees of monitoring activity, use of this exception by
employers should increase.
' 204
The Kraslawsky court, on the other hand, viewed consent only "as a
factor in the balancing analysis, and not a complete defense to a privacy
claim[,] ' '205 but that case dealt with an invasion that was far more
offensive than reading an individual's email. Instead, Kraslawsky
involved forcing employees to take drug tests and the termination of an
employee for failure to take the test.206 When an employer requires drug
testing as a condition of employment, the employee must either agree to
the invasion of privacy or lose their job, whereas in our line of cases,
"[w]hen an employer requires consent to email monitoring, the
employee.., can avoid any invasion of [their] privacy by using [the]
computer for business purposes only, and not for anything personal., 20 7
202. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(d) (2002).
203. McIntosh, supra note 81, at 577.
204. Id.
205. Kraslawsky v. Upper Deck Co., 56 Cal. App. 4th 179, 193 (Cal. Ct. App.
1997).
206. Id. at 182.
207. TBG Ins. Svcs. Corp. v. Superior Court, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 450 n.5 (Cal. Ct.
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Following this logic, in the context of an email monitoring case, consent
would be a complete defense to an invasion of privacy claim. When the
traditional privacy analysis is applied to the practice of monitoring web-
based, personal email accounts in the workplace, employers do not have
as strong a legal position as they do when monitoring company,
proprietary email accounts.
The seminal case that discusses monitoring of web-based, personal
email accounts is Fischer v. Mount Olive Lutheran Church.2 °8 In this
case, the employer, Mount Olive Lutheran Church, through its agent,
Defendant Connor, accessed the plaintiffs Hotmail email account
without notice, consent, or authorization. 20 9 The court opined that the
legislative history of the Federal Wiretap Act showed that Congress
intended the Act to cover this situation of email monitoring.210  For
support, the Fischer court quoted an example from the legislative history
of the act:
For example, a computer mail facility authorizes a subscriber to
access information in their portion of the facilities [sic] storage.
Accessing the storage of other subscribers without specific
authorization to do so would be a violation of the act. Similarly, a
member of the general public authorized to access the public portion
of a computer facility would violate this section by intentionally
exceeding that authorization and accessing the private portions of the
facility.
2 1 1
The Fischer case is the only decision on this issue of an employer
monitoring an employee's web-based email. The court did not provide a
full discussion on the merits of the plaintiffs case and did not go into
detail about how the various exceptions to the ECPA would apply to an
employer monitoring an employee's web-based email account.
Accordingly, we do not yet have a court decision that specifically
discusses how the ECPA exceptions will apply to this form of email
monitoring.
The court in Fischer applied 18 U.S.C. § 2701 of the Stored
App. 2002).
208. 207 F. Supp. 2d 914 (W.D. Wis. 2002).
209. Id. at 921.
210. Id. at 926.
211. Id.
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Communications Act (SCA)212 to a webmail monitoring context and thus
provided some statutory guidance. The court suggested that employers
who access employees' email accounts without authority and then
proceed to block the employee's access to their own account will be in
violation of the SCA provision of intentionally exceeding an
authorization to access that facility and thereby obtain, alter, or prevent
authorized access to a wire or electronic communication.213 If the
employer guessed or hacked the password of an employee's web-based
email account, the employer would then have access to all of the
employee's email. The employer could even view email that the
employee himself had not yet viewed, and had no intention of ever
viewing in the office. Based on this reading of the Fischer opinion, an
employer can read email from any email account that an employee has,
even if the employee only used that account from the office just one
time. The employer would only be liable if they blocked the employee
from viewing their own mail. There is no valid justification for an
employer monitoring email accounts that are rarely, if ever, viewed in
the office.2 14 This type of email does not negatively effect work
productivity, or subject the employer to adverse risks; therefore, it
should not weigh in favor of the reasonableness of such an invasion of
privacy. It seems the court has approached the locked door of one's
private email and given the key to employers.
One commentator said of the Fischer case that it sets
some boundaries describing what clearly is off limits, such as
changing passwords, and what is clearly within the SCA and ECPA,
monitoring which is approved under Fraser. In summary, while the
court leaves unresolved the issue of monitoring webmail, they
apparently approve of monitoring web-based, personal email
messages accessed from work.
215
A major problem with the aforementioned analysis is that there is
no difference between "webmail" and "web-based personal, email
messages accessed from work" that the commentator refers to. An
employer cannot access an employee's web-based email account and
212. Title II of the Federal Wiretap Act.
213. Fischer, 207 F. Supp. 2d at 926; 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (a)(2).
214. Kevin W. Chapman, I Spy Something Read! Employer Monitoring of Personal
Employee Webmail Accounts, 5 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 121, 138 (2003).
215. Id. at 140.
THINK BEFORE YOU TYPE
know which emails were viewed from the office. Therefore, monitoring
of webmail must be either legal or illegal. There cannot be a middle
ground that permits employers to read only those emails that they think
an employee viewed while at work. That situation is illogical and
unworkable. Perhaps what the court was implying in Fischer was that
email, once it is read and saved on the company computer or server,
becomes just like any other computer file that is saved on the computer.
However, the ECPA does not apply to such files because there is no
communication taking place. The courts agree that no reasonable
expectation of privacy exists for the files that are saved on a company
computer, thus, a tort claim based on monitoring of files in storage
would not stand.216
After this discussion, it turns out that Fischer does not say much
about how the ECPA is applied in the context of an employer
monitoring web-based email. Therefore, the question remains as to the
law in such a case. While the new monitoring technology may not affect
all of the previously discussed factors, employer monitoring may not be
justified in every situation and may actually at times impinge on
employees' privacy interests. Courts have given little indication of
whether this new personal, web-based monitoring scheme would be a
common law violation of an employee's privacy. Neither of the two
prongs of the invasion of privacy test, whether a reasonable expectation
of privacy exists or whether the monitoring would be highly offensive to
a reasonable person, has been addressed directly by the courts. At this
point, only inferences can be drawn from the courts' reasoning behind
denying the common law claims in the company, proprietary email
monitoring cases. Similarities exist between the two email monitoring
situations, and many of the same analyses will apply.
B. Monitoring Personal Email Accounts
The analysis of monitoring personal email accounts should begin
with the least controversial situation, where the employee has consented
to email monitoring. The key Restatement requirement for employer
liability is that the employee has a reasonable expectation of privacy.21 7
216. See, e.g., Thygeson v. U.S. Bancorp, No. CV-03-467-ST, 2004 WL 2066746
(D. Or. Sept 15, 2004); Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-
RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
217. See supra notes 71-74 and accompanying text.
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In such an instance where an employee specifically does not use the
company email system, but instead uses their own private, web-based
email account, one may think that the employee has a reasonable
expectation of privacy. The employee took an extra step to protect their
privacy by using a personal account, and a reasonable person would
most likely believe that there is at least a higher degree of privacy in
web-based email used in the workplace than in the company, proprietary
email. Intercepting email when it was thought to be private and
unreachable is much more offensive than monitoring a company,
proprietary email system and cuts against the employer because the
employee may have an objectively higher expectation of privacy in their
web-based, personal email account.
Of all the factors considered by the courts in weighing the
legitimacy of email monitoring, the one that could exclusively justify
employer monitoring is the company's interest in avoiding legal
liability. 218 The court in Booker v. GTE.net, LLC 19 opined that
companies could be held liable on the theory of respondeat superior for
unmonitored use of web-based email accounts by employees at work.
Therefore, an employer may still be liable for harassing or
discriminatory emails sent by employees from their own web-based
email accounts if a plaintiff can show that the email was sent from a
company computer, using the company's Internet, on company time, and
for a purpose that benefited the employer.220 Proving benefit to the
employer is the most difficult because discriminatory emails do not
typically benefit the company. Avoiding legal liability was a factor that
favored the employer under the previous analysis but does not lean in
either direction under the web-based email analysis.
However, there are still some factors weighing in the employer's
218. See Echols, supra note 45, at 295-298.
219. 350 F.3d 515 (6th Cir. 2003) (discussing the circumstances under which
respondeat superior will apply, stating "the critical analysis is whether the employee or
agent was acting within the scope of his employment at the time of his tortious act"); Id.
at 518 (quoting Osborne v. Payne, 31 S.W.3d 911, 915 (Ky. 2000)). Generally,
intentional torts are committed outside the scope of the employment. However, some
intentional conduct is so closely related to the employment that it is considered within
the scope of employment. The issue of whether an employee's conduct is within the
scope of employment is a question of law.
220. Id. at 518; see also Blakey v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J.
2000).
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favor. Emails can still be forwarded to anyone, and thus employees
should have a diminished expectation of privacy. 2  More importantly,
the knowledge that the employer is monitoring email, combined with
consent to the monitoring, severely curtails any expectation of privacy
the employees may have.222
When evaluating the second prong of the Restatement,
"offensiveness to a reasonable person,'223 inferences also must be drawn
from the company email monitoring cases. As with company email
monitoring, businesses still have legitimate interests to protect, and
presumably employees will be put on notice of possible monitoring if a
policy exists. Employees make a calculated choice to have their email
monitored by choosing to use the employer's Internet to log on to their
personal account. These are some of the factors courts have relied on in
holding that a reasonable person would not find the monitoring highly
offensive.224 Because both the monitoring of company systems and
web-based email systems share these features,
[t]he courts may reach the same conclusions regarding monitoring of
web-based email accounts as they do for company accounts.
Therefore, due to the similarity of the characteristics the courts view
as important, if employers follow the same procedures as they do
when monitoring company email, a valid claim for invasion of
privacy would not exist when monitoring personal webmail, so long
as it has been accessed from the company's computer and company
provided Internet access.
225
However, the Restatement factors would not weigh as heavily in
favor of employers as they do in cases where the employee is using a
company email system, so it is unclear how the courts would rule on a
claim of invasion of privacy. We must shift the analysis to the ECPA in
order to determine if the decision of the courts on a privacy claim would
be any clearer.
When dealing with web-based email accounts, the business use
exception'16 of the ECPA would not apply because it is meant for
221. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 122-125 and accompanying text.
223. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652B (1977).
224. See supra notes 135-140 and accompanying text.
225. Chapman, supra note 214, at 147.
226. 18 U.S.C. § 2510 (5)(a) (2002).
2005]
152 FORDHAMJOURNAL OF CORPORATE & [Vol. XI
FINANCIAL LA W
devices that are a basic part of the everyday business proceedings.227
One example is a phone extension, something that is built into the phone
system and is a necessary part of its day-to-day operation.228 In the
context of an employer email system, the monitoring aspect is built into
the email system and is a basic part of its day-to-day function.
However, in the web-based email context, any software that intercepts
this type of email is extraneous to the company Internet system and has
no necessary purpose for the business other than to monitor email.
Whether the service provider exception 229 would apply to this type
of email monitoring is not clear. The employee is not using the
company provided email system but is using the company provided
Internet access.230 Would the Internet access be enough for the
employer to be considered a service provider under the service provider
exception and be free from liability for intercepting employee emails?
This is another factor that does not clearly favor either side. The consent
exception follows the same analysis as that by company email systems
and will weigh solely in the favor of the employer.
The last ECPA exception is the requirement that the email be
intercepted contemporaneously with the transmission. New spyware
technology intercepts emails at the exact moment of transmission.231 At
the same instant that the recipient views the email, a copy is sent to the
employer. Because of the contemporaneous nature of the interception,
even the manufacturer has characterized the new software as "almost a
wiretap. '232 This contemporaneous exception has been the downfall of
virtually every lawsuit based on the Federal Wiretap Statute. Such
227. See supra note 143 and accompanying text.
228. See, e.g., Fischer v. Mount Olive Lutheran Church, 207 F. Supp. 2d 914, 921
(W.D. Wis. 2002).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 2511 (2)(a)(i) (2002).
230. See supra note 145 and accompanying text.
231. This form of spyware is not to be confused with the common usage of the term
with regard to Internet use. Most forms of spyware that people are familiar with keep
track of Internet use in order to cause pop up advertisements to appear on the computer
that the user is more likely to click. In this note, the term "spyware" refers to programs
that are used to spy on the user, without the user's knowledge. The spy programs will
not cause any pop ups to appear as they are designed to remain surreptitious at all times.
232. Bob Sullivan, Who's Spying on my Hotmail?, Computer Crime Research
Center (Aug. 28, 2002), http://www.crime-research.org/news/2002/08/Mess3004.htm
(quoting Doug Fowler, President of SpectorSoft Corp., speaking about his email
monitoring program eBlaster).
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technology would now fulfill the contemporaneity requirement of the
ECPA, and may finally allow employees a cause of action under the
ECPA based on employer monitoring of their email. 33
The last situation that must be analyzed is the one that is least
favorable to employers, where the employer is monitoring an
employee's web-based, personal email without the employee's consent.
In the Restatement analysis, the expectation of privacy factors are
almost the same as in cases where there is consent. The only difference
is the consent analysis because here there is no employee consent.
Possibly, the courts will find implied consent by the employee as
they did in Smyth and other cases.2 34 This implied consent, however, is
likely to be found only when the email in question involves a company
email system because the only cases that courts have ruled consent was
implied have involved company, proprietary email systems. 35 In fact,
the employee clearly did not consent when they went out of their way to
use a private email system while knowing that the company email
system was being monitored. Therefore, it cannot be assumed that
general consent to monitor will also cover the web-based, personal email
accounts. The spyware that allows monitoring of such personal
accounts is a new innovation, with which many employees are not
familiar. This type of monitoring, therefore, will most likely require
specific consent. As such, absent specific consent to monitor web-
based, personal email accounts, an employer quite possibly will face
liability for use of the new monitoring technology on these types of
email accounts. The case history and statutory interpretations of this
type of monitoring are relatively new and undeveloped, so the
previously pro-employer legal outcomes are not as certain.
The final analysis is to apply the ECPA exceptions to the web-
233. See supra notes 150-168 and accompanying text for a full analysis of the
contemporaneity requirement.
234. Smyth v. Pillsbury, 914 F. Supp. 97 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (holding plaintiff had no
"reasonable expectation of privacy" despite the fact that the employer expressly stated
the emails would not be intercepted or used against employees. In order to support such
a holding the court may have implicitly held that there was implied consent in this case,
although the court never mentioned the issue of consent.); see also supra notes 174-178
and accompanying text.
235. See, e.g., TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Zieminski, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 450
(Cal. Ct. App. 2002); Garrity v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., No. 00-12143-
RWZ, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8343 (D. Mass. May 7, 2002).
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based email context. As stated previously, the business use exception,
the service provider exception, and the contemporaneity requirement
exception may not apply in such a case.236 The consent exception would
also not apply in this case because courts have never implied consent
when they were not dealing with an employer email system. 7
Therefore, none of the ECPA exceptions would apply to an employer,
and an employee may have a cause of action under the federal statute.
What may be gleaned from the various courts' analyses of the law
is that if there is a well designed company policy in place for legitimate
purposes, the employer will be able to monitor employees' web-based
email at work. These legitimate purposes would be the same ones that
were previously discussed, for example preventing the selling of trade
secrets or preventing corporate liability. This company policy would
place the monitoring under the consent exception to the ECPA, and
remove any tort related expectation of privacy. Moreover, the ECPA
only covers interception of electronic communication while in transit.
238
Companies need only ensure that they are not intercepting the messages,
and instead are accessing the email from storage. The Court of Appeals
for the First Circuit would disagree with this practice, and allow ECPA
liability even if the message is intercepted while in storage. 9  If
employers do intercept the email at the time of transmission as would be
the case with the new spyware programs, the question of whether such
an action violates the ECPA still remains.
V. STATE APPROACHES TO EMAIL PRIVACY AND PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Since the ECPA exceptions create problems for employees trying to
protect their workplace privacy, many states have taken it upon
themselves to enact workplace privacy laws. Some states require notice
of monitoring. Both Connecticut and Delaware have enacted legislation
to require employers to give such notice to employees of their
236. See supra notes 226-233 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 234-236 and accompanying text.
238. See supra notes 150-168 and accompanying text.
239. See United States v. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005) (discussing the
criminal sanctions of the ECPA. However, the ECPA also allows a private cause of
action, and the elements of both criminal and civil actions are identical.); see also supra
notes 150-168 and accompanying text.
THINK BEFORE YOU TYPE
monitoring policies.24° These laws do not prevent email monitoring;
they merely require notice of the monitoring. 241 However, even the
notice requirements are not stringent and are easily fulfilled without
much protection or benefit to the employee.242 Exempted from the
notice requirements are "processes that are designed to manage the type
or volume of incoming or outgoing electronic mail.., that are not
targeted to monitor or intercept.., usage of a particular individual, and
that are performed solely for the purpose of computer system
maintenance and or protection., 243 The problem with this exception is
that any email that looks "irregular" can be viewed using the legitimate
excuse of computer maintenance, and anything the email contains can be
used against the employee as long as the employer can give any valid
purpose for viewing the email. The employees in these companies will
have no knowledge that their emails are being monitored for any
purpose, and may not be careful in keeping their private matters out of
the emails they send.
California has attempted to take the lead on this issue with a bill
that would require employers to inform employees of their monitoring of
email messages.2" The law would also mandate that employees sign an
acknowledgment of receiving notice of the monitoring and allow
employees access to information collected about them through
monitoring.245 In 1999, the California bill passed through both houses of
the California legislature, but was vetoed by former Governor Gray
Davis because of concerns regarding the burden the legislation would
impose on employers. Governor Davis asserted that when employees
accept employment, they should assume that employers have the right to
monitor their electronic communication as a condition of such
employment.246 Like California, several states have debated similar
laws, yet none have enacted an employee privacy statute.247
Some states have adopted certain provisions of the federal EPCA,
240. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2004); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 19, § 705 (2005).
241. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 31-48d (2004); DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 19, § 705 (2005).
242. Finkin, supra note 28, at 477-478.
243. DEL. CODE ANN., tit. 19, § 705e (2002 Supp.).
244. Cal. Senate Bill 1822, available at http://info.sen.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/pagequery?type=senbilinfo&site=sen&title= Bill+Information.
245. Id.
246. See Michael & Lidman, supra note 14.
247. McIntosh, supra note 81, at 559.
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while limiting the consent exception, by requiring that both the sender
and recipient of an email consent to the monitoring.248 This would allow
employees much greater freedom in protecting their privacy because
even if they consent it will be the rare occasion that the non-employee
party to the emails would consent. The scope of state protection under
such statutes varies greatly. For instance, states like Nebraska have
specifically exempted employers from the provisions of their
wiretapping statute, thus providing employees virtually no protections
from interception of electronically communicated information.2 49 Still
other states, "like Texas, have attempted, though unsuccessfully, to
extend protection to employees... by proscribing secret electronic
surveillance and unreasonable searches.,
250
Seeking to bring uniformity to the patchwork of inconsistent rules
that extend to email, the Notice of Electronic Monitoring Act (NEMA)
was introduced with bi-partisan support in both houses of Congress.2
NEMA was intended to impose a fair and reasonable check on
monitoring activities and afford employees the right to know whether,
when, and how their employer is watching them.2 12 Although NEMA is
aimed at enhancing employee privacy rights, it does not deprive an
employer of the right to monitor. NEMA acknowledges that, while
employees should not have an expectation of privacy in email
voluntarily sent, stored, or received on the company's system, the
employees are entitled to clear notice from employers who choose to
exercise their monitoring rights.253
NEMA covers reading employee email, keystroke monitoring, and
programs that monitor employee Internet use.2 54 It provides that the
requisite notice must be clear, conspicuous, given annually and
whenever policies change.2 5 The notice must also specify the frequency
248. Paul E. Hash, E-mail, Electronic Monitoring, and Employee Privacy, 37 S. TEX
L. REV. 893, 905 (1996).
249. NEB. REv. STAT. ANN. §86-290 (2005).
250. Settle-Vinson, supra note 35, at 67.
251. See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Workplace Privacy (Aug. 3, 2004),
http://www.epic.org/privacy/workplace/default.html (stating NEMA was introduced in
2000 by Democratic Senator Chuck Schumer and Republican Representative Charles
Canady).
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of the monitoring, the kinds of information likely to be monitored, how
the monitoring will be accomplished, and how the information will be
stored and used. 6  If an employer engages in secret monitoring in
violation of the notice requirements under the Act, they are subject to
suit for up to $20,000.257
CONCLUSION
A growing number of companies are monitoring both email and
Internet communications of employees. Studies have revealed that more
than three-quarters of major U.S. corporations routinely record and
review employee communications and activities in the workplace.258
These activities include employee telephone calls, email usage and
computer files. The employees often dislike the monitoring and have
repeatedly sued to prevent it, but "[iun a decade of Internet-related,
workplace privacy cases, private employers have prevailed in every
instance.,
25 9
One commentator has astutely written a "word to the wise"
employee: "treat your email systems at work as you should your
business phone. Strictly limit your communications with family and
friends. And do not send a message if you would be uncomfortable
having a co-worker or your employer read it."'260 The commentator also
advised that one should never send an email from work that you would
be afraid to "read the next day on the front page of a newspaper.',
261
This warning to employees is very telling of the current state of the law
on the practice of employers monitoring their employees' email. In
addition, employees have yet to win a case brought against an employer
for invading their privacy. There are statutes and common law
principles prohibiting such invasions, but the courts have made the law
in these situations, and the law is simple: employers can monitor the
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See American Management Association, supra note 1.
259. Rustad & Koenig, supra note 124, at 95.
260. Chapman, supra note 214, at 152 (quoting Barbara Kate Repa, Computers and
Email on the Job, http://www.hrlawinfo.com/lawguide/Privacy/
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email of their employees as they see fit, with or without the consent of
the employees. For their part, employers will continue to monitor the
email as long as they feel that it will reduce liability and corporate losses
arising from abuses of employee email use.
Courts have made it clear that employers should require specific
consent from their employees to monitor both company email accounts
as well as web-based, personal email accounts. There should be a
company policy that is not merely read and signed by the employee
when they begin their employment but should first be actively explained
to the employee, and the employee should be reminded of the policy,
perhaps often, to prevent any confusion or mistake over the rights of the
employee and employer.
Companies should adopt email policies and employee training
programs that address these problems and deal with the extent to which
company internal and external email is private and secure. They should
also deal with the protection of company trade secrets, proprietary
information, and confidential information, and avoiding copyright
infringement. Most importantly, the policies should make it crystal clear
that the users must avoid improper communications that may lead to
corporate liability.
Employers do not have to do much to avoid violating the privacy
rights of employees. They must weigh the consequences of monitoring
their employees email and impinging on their employees' reasonable
expectations of privacy with the benefit they receive from such
monitoring practices.2 62  Employers should ensure that they have
legitimate and legally valid reasons before they begin to monitor their
employees' email at work.263 Employers should also "strongly consider
whether there are other, less intrusive means to accomplish their
objectives before deciding to engage in any kind of electronic
surveillance of employees." 264 While this may seem to be an exacting
and tough set of requirements placed on the employers, courts have been
very lenient in this regard, and have always found that the employers'
reasons, however de minimis, were legitimate.
It is hardly surprising, therefore, that employers are told that they
262. Louise Ann Fernandez, Workplace Claims: Guiding Employers And Employees
Safely In And Out Of The Revolving Door, Practicing Law Institute: Litigation and
Administrative Practice Course Handbook Series, 614 PLULIT 725, 789-90 (1999).
263. Id.
264. Id.
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should establish a policy for the use of email and the Internet that they
require every employee to read and sign.265 Employers can diminish an
individual employee's expectation of privacy by clearly stating in the
policy that electronic communications are to be used solely for company
business, and that the company reserves the right to monitor or access all
employee email usage. "An electronic communications policy should
[also] include a statement prohibiting the transmission of any
discriminatory, offensive or unprofessional messages. 266
Such a policy incorporates notice and consent and removes any
expectation of privacy from both company email and web-based email.
When the companies require their employees to sign a consent form, the
companies should "specifically call out and highlight the fact that the
company's policy will apply to personal web-based e-mail access. 26 7
The policy effectively shuts the door on all privacy related employee
lawsuits, and does so in a manner that is respectful to the employees of
the company. It is evident that the reasons behind implementing these
policies are to help the company and not to harm or harass the
employees. This should counteract many of the negative aspects of
265. The following is an example of an Internet use policy and that can be utilized
by an employer, and that includes some of the courts' recommended language:
I, _ , realize that electronic communications are to be used solely for company
business, and that the (company name) (hereafter known as "the Company") reserves
the right to monitor or access all employee Internet or email usage. Furthermore, I am
fully aware that the Company will keep copies of Internet or email passwords, and
that the existence of such passwords is not an assurance of the confidentiality of the
communications.
This Company also does not tolerate the following:
The transmission of any discriminatory, offensive or unprofessional messages.
Access to any Internet sites that are discriminatory or offensive.
Posting personal opinions on the Internet using the Company's access, particularly if
the opinion is of a political or discriminatory nature.
Lastly, I am fully aware that my use of computers in the employment context carries
with it social norms that effectively diminish my reasonable expectation of privacy
with regard to my use of the company's computers. Any violation of the above
agreement may result in termination of my employment.
Louis J. Papa and Stuart L. Bass, How Employers Can Protect Themselves From
Liability For Employees' Misuse Of Computer, Internet, And Email Systems In The
Workplace, 10 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 110, 122 (2004).
266. TBG Ins. Services Corp. v. Zieminski, 96 Cal. App. 4th 443, 451 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
267. Chapman, supra note 214, at 149.
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monitoring that employees have complained about.
268
Employees in the private workforce currently enjoy no privacy in
their electronic mail communications. Even though legal doctrines exist
that would seem to recognize a right to privacy for employees, courts
have been wary to extend that right very far into the workplace.2 69 As
such, private employees have been subjected to monitoring of their
email communications in the workplace, and will continue to be subject
to such monitoring. Employers believe monitoring of employee email
will stem liability for abuses such as corporate espionage and fostering a
hostile work environment. At the same time, monitoring hurts the
employees because it erodes employee privacy, and creates stress that
has a direct negative impact on the emotional and physical health of
employees.270
At this juncture, much of the privacy that the Federal Wiretap Act
was created to protect has been eviscerated by the realities of modem
technology. The statutory language is out of step with the technological
realties of advanced computer surveillance and monitoring. The
majority of courts, however, do not feel that it is in their province to
"graft [new provisions or] meaning onto the statute where Congress has
spoken plainly. '2 7' This has led to some decisions that may not seem
fair, or in tune with the high tech and Internet powered world. The
Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Councilman took the realities of
modem technology into account when they reached their recent
decision.27 2 The court did not believe that Congress intended to
perpetuate a toothless statute. While some courts insist that their hands
are tied by the existing statute and will remain as such until the law is
reformed to address the modem day privacy issues, other courts are now
taking proactive steps to help advance these reforms. Perhaps United
States v. Councilman27 3 will serve as a wake-up call to courts around the
nation and cause them to take into account that the Internet has forever
changed our cherished right to privacy.
268. See supra notes 44-50 and accompanying text.
269. O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
270. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
271. United States v. Councilman, 373 F.3d 197, 204 (1st Cir. 2004), vacated, 418
F.3d 67 (1st Cir. 2005).
272. Councilman, 418 F.3d 67.
273. Id.
